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Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis has reiterated the need for Africa to build resilience to global 
output shocks. In this paper we examine empirically the role of intra-regional and intra-
African trade linkages in being an absorber of the global output shocks in two African 
regional economic communities. We find that deeper intra-regional and intra-African trade 
ties have helped the East African Community (EAC) absorb the global output shocks. In 
contrast, the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) region has been less able to cope with 
global output shocks partly due to weaker regional integration. Intra-regional and intra-
African trade with fast-growing economies, together with geographically diversified trade 
links, can strengthen the capacity to absorb global shocks.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent global financial crisis has brought about renewed emphasis on the links of African 
countries with the global economy, both individually and collectively, via regional economic 
communities (RECs). On balance, Africa has exhibited resilience during the global financial 
crisis. Still, differences emerged across countries and Africa’s regions, with RECs showing 
different degrees of output co-movements with the global economy.5 This paper examines the 
role that intra-regional and intra-African trade can play in explaining such differences in 
output co-movements and in protecting African countries from global output shocks. It 
focuses on the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU) because of different patterns of trade and growth that these RECs exhibited. 
  
This paper seeks to answer the following questions: Can intra-regional trade help explain the 
differences in output co-movements between African countries/regions and advanced 
economies? How can African countries and regions mitigate the impact of global output 
shocks through regional integration? With rising frequency of global output shocks, 
answering these questions is of great importance to policymakers in Africa and elsewhere.   
 
Except for South Africa, the output shock transmission from the global economy to Africa, 
and especially its RECs, has been relatively understudied.6 The recent research on the global 
shock spillovers to Africa during and after the global financial crisis includes Drummond and 
Ramirez (2009), Gurara and Ncube (2013); and Tapsoba and Diallo (2014). This paper adds 
to this stream of literature by examining the impact of global output shocks on Africa’s RECs 
with a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model utilizing real GDP data, as in Kim and 
Chow (2003), Brixiova et al. (2010) and others.7 The links of output shock synchronization 
and intra-regional trade are tested by regressing output co-movements on pair-wise trade 
linkages, including intra-industry trade as in Calderon et al. (2009) and IMF (2013). 
 
We found that the deeper intra-regional trade in the EAC region as well as the EAC region’s 
trade links with the rest of Africa have increased the community’s resilience to global output 
shocks. However, the SACU region proved less immune to such shocks. This can be in part 
explained by South Africa’s developed financial system which facilitated heavy exposure to 
global shocks also via financial linkages, as evidenced by capital outflows that the country 
experienced. In turn, the small SACU members were exposed to global output shocks both 
directly through their trade linkages with Europe and through their trade with South Africa.8   
 
The policy implications from our analysis therefore nuance the common recommendation of 
promoting regional integration in Africa to build resilience. While intra-regional trade can 
help build resilience, this is not an automatic result. To benefit from regional integration in 
5 As other developing economies, African countries experienced a notable increase in output co-movements 
with advanced economies during the global financial crisis. However, the degree of this co-movement differed 
across countries and sub-regions, and was, in particular, much higher for the SACU than the EAC economies. 
6 Ҫakir and Kabundi (2011), de Waal (2013), Ncube and Ndou (2013) studied this transmission to South Africa.  
7  To our knowledge, this approach, relying on output data, has not been applied to Africa’s RECs. The 
advantage of output data is their timeliness and quality, which is comparable to those in other developing 
regions (AfDB, 2013). Research investigating shock synchronization within Africa’s RECs frequently relies on 
the SVAR model with decomposition as in Blanchard and Quah (1989). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) 
applied this identification scheme to the optimal currency area theory. Mafusire and Brixiova (2013), among 
others, utilized this approach in the context of the EAC convergence and readiness for monetary union.  
8 African exports are vulnerable to banking crises in the countries they export to (Berman and Martin, 2012).  
2 
 
                                                          
the face of global shocks, countries need to diversify their geographical composition of trade 
so as to include fast growing economies, both in Africa and other regions.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature while Section 3 
outlines key stylized facts on growth. Section 4 carries out the empirical investigation of 
Africa’s resilience to global output shocks. Section 5 concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature 
 
This paper builds on two streams of literature. The first is the literature on output co-
movements between the global economy and Africa, with the global economy encompassing 
both the advanced economies and the BRICs. The transmission mechanisms of global output 
shocks to Africa, and especially its RECs, are relatively understudied. Existing empirical 
findings on this important topic are following. First, utilizing panel regressions of growth of 
the domestic real GDP per capita on growth in the USA, Japan and the EU, IMF (2007) 
found that one percentage point decrease in growth in the EU (US) leads to 0.25 (0.1) 
percentage point decline in growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, trade linkages were 
viewed as key for transmission. Linking domestic growth with that of the trading partners, 
Ndulu and O’Connell (2007) showed that 1 percentage increase in growth of real GDP of 
trading partners leads to 0.4 increase in the domestic real GDP growth. 9  Third, one 
percentage increase in real GDP growth in Eurozone (BRICs) would lead to 0.34 – 0.6 
increase in Africa (0.09 – 0.23 percentage point in Africa) (Gurara and Ncube, 2013). Finally, 
Diallo and Tapsoba (2014) demonstrated that sub-Saharan Africa’s business cycle has been 
shifting from EU to BRICs.  
 
Regarding drivers of output shock (e.g., the business cycle) synchronization, trade integration, 
together with financial linkages, has emerged as one of the key factors in the earlier 
literature.10  The second stream of literature we build on is therefore the literature linking 
trade and growth that shows that business cycles are more synchronized between countries 
that have substantial bilateral trade. More specifically, the empirical literature provides ample 
evidence that higher trade integration leads to more synchronized business cycles in the 
advanced economies, starting with the pioneering work of Frankel and Rose (1997) and 
elaborated in Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Gruben et al. (2002), Imbs (2004) and others. 
Calderon et al. (2007) found positive and statistically significant impact of the trade intensity 
on the output shock synchronization also among developing countries, but smaller than that 
among the advanced economies. 11  In turn, Tapsoba (2010) showed that trade intensity 
increased the business cycle synchronization also in Africa, but again less so than in 
advanced economies.  
 
The differences in the impact of trade on output shock synchronization can be explained by 
patterns of output specialization and bilateral trade (Calderon et al., 2007). This literature 
builds on earlier work of Krugman (1991) who found that business cycles can be more 
synchronized among countries with similar production structures. Frankel and Rose (1997) 
9 Similarly, according to Drummond and Ramirez (2009), one percentage point decrease in growth in the ‘rest of 
the world’ leads to 0.4 percentage point decrease in Africa. 
10  Other factors include common perceptions/shifts in business sentiments (IMF, 2013). Theoretical 
underpinnings to linking the business cycle synchronization to that of trade intensity can be found in Stockmann 
(1988) who decomposed growth in a country to (i) aggregate shocks and (ii) sector-specific shocks.  
11 The authors use data for 147 developing countries during the period 1960 – 1999.  
3 
 
                                                          
and Fidrmuc (2004) demonstrated that intra-industry trade leads to greater output shock 
synchronization, while Kose and Yi (2001) demonstrated the role of vertical integration.  
 
The objective of this paper is two-fold. The first goal is to examine the output shock 
synchronization between Africa’s RECs on the one hand and the advanced economies on the 
other. The second goal is to study the determinants of this synchronization and in particular 
the relationship between output shock comovements and bilateral (intra-industry) trade in 
member countries within RECs.  This will help determine if and how intra-regional – and 
intra-industry – trade in Africa facilitates output shock synchronization.  
 
3. Stylized Facts  
 
3.1 Growth Patterns  
 
Since the early 2000s, Africa has posted rapid growth. Moreover, its growth was broad-based, 
with more than 60 percent of countries having grown on average at 4 or more percent a year. 
Still, substantial differences in growth patterns prevail across countries and regions.   
  
With the EAC region containing some of the fastest growing countries in the world, its 
growth was both faster and less volatile than that of the SACU region in the past three 
decades (Table 1). This growth acceleration reflected benign external conditions as well as 
improved macroeconomic management and business environment. Unlike the fast growing 
EAC, the SACU countries have been characterized by a low growth and high inequality. 
Unemployment, especially among youth, income inequality, and widespread poverty, is a key 
challenge for these middle income countries.12   
 
Table 1. Real GDP Growth and Volatility: Africa, EAC, SACU and Advanced Economies 
  1981 - 90 1991 - 2000 2001 - 07 2008 - 10 2011 - 12 
EAC - growth 3.9 2.6 6.1 5.5 5.4 
         relative SD 0.40 0.72 0.19 … … 
SACU - growth 1.7 2.0 4.4 1.8 3.1 
         relative SD 1.47 1.00 0.29 … … 
SSA - growth 2.4 2.0 6.2 4.7 5.2 
         relative SD 0.91 0.85 0.16 … … 
Advanced  Ec.- growth 3.3 2.9 2.4 -0.1 1.6 
         relative SD 0.42 0.30 0.29 … … 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF WEO (December 2013) database. Note: Advanced economies are 
defined as in the IMF WEO database. SD stands for standard deviation. Growth (relative standard deviation) is 
calculated as average of annual growth rates (annual relative standard deviations) over a given period.  
 
During the global financial crisis, the EAC region’s limited financial integration into global 
markets protected it from direct financial shocks. The impact of indirect financial channels 
was subdued, as the EAC banks tend to fund their loans from deposits. The crisis was thus 
transmitted mostly through trade and in some cases also foreign investment, aid, remittances 
and tourism receipts (Brixiova and Ndikumana, 2013).13 In contrast, South Africa, which is 
12 Despite the EAC’s overall high growth, a closer look reveals notable differences among members at any point 
of time and in individual countries over time. Countries that were pulling the sub-region’s growth rate down in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s were leading it from mid-1990s on (e.g., Rwanda, as it emerged from conflict).  
13 The impact of falling import demand can be amplified by disruptions in trade finance, in particular in low 
income countries with less developed financial sector (Berman and Martin, 2012; Turner et. al., 2011). 
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closely integrated into the global financial system, was impacted through both financial and 
trade channels (Ncube et al., 2012a and 2012b; Ncube and Ndou, 2013). In turn, the crisis 
was transmitted to the small SACU members via trade with South Africa and EU.    
 
The negative impact of the global financial crisis on growth was notable in both the EAC and 
the SACU regions in 2009, but both sub-regions have recovered fast. In the EAC region, the 
strong fundamentals and buffers established prior to the crisis facilitated, through counter-
cyclical policies and public investment, this fast growth revival. High growth and timely 
recovery during this global recession is in sharp contrast with the 1991 crisis, when the EAC 
region grew less than the world economy and recovered with significant delay (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Real GDP Growth around the Past Two Global Crises  
 
Figure 1a. Real GDP growth, 1989 - 94 Figure 1b. Real GDP growth, 2007 - 12 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF WEO (December 2013) database. 
 
3.2 Output Co-movements  
 
Output co-movement between the advanced economies and Africa’s RECs and countries 
reflect the degree of shock synchronization between these groups of countries. These co-
movements could be induced either by large common (global) shocks affecting 
simultaneously advanced and African countries or spill-overs of country specific shocks in 
advanced economies to Africa (IMF, 2013). As in other developing countries, the co-
movement of the EAC and the SACU regions with advanced economies rose during the 
financial crisis, but markedly more so in the SACU than the EAC region (Figure 2). The chart 
below also captures the decisive role of South Africa within the SACU group.  
      
Looking at individual countries reveals that growth rates of the individual EAC members 
were correlated with growth of the EAC region. The real GDP growth rates of Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the EAC exhibited co-movements with those of Africa. With 
the exception of the crisis period, the co-movements of the growth rates of the EAC countries 
with the global economy are weak and in some cases negative, suggesting overall low shock 
synchronization between the advanced economies and the EAC (Table A1, Annex I). 
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Figure 2. The Evolution of Output Co-movements, 1990 - 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF WEO (December 2013) database. Note: This co-movement is 
measured by correlations of growth rates, as in IMF (2013). 
 
Except for South Africa which accounts for most of the SACU’s output, the co-movements of 
growth of the SACU members with the SACU region are weaker than in the EAC.14 The 
SACU is highly correlated with Africa, reflecting the important economic role played by 
South Africa on the continent. In turn, growth rates of the SACU countries are more closely 
than EAC’s growth rates associated with those of advanced economies (Table A1, Annex I).  
 
3.3 Structural Similarity  
 
Countries’ structural characteristics impact their responses to shocks. Structural similarity 
facilitates shock synchronization, i.e. common shocks would impact countries with similar 
output structures similarly ways. In this section we examine the degree of structural similarity 
between the EAC and the SACU regions and advanced economies, as well as that of 
individual countries and their RECs. Shocks in RECs may not be synchronized due to 
asymmetric, country-specific shocks and/or differences in the transmission mechanisms of 
common shocks. Structural similarity reduces the impact of these factors.15  
 
a. Structural Similarity Measured by the Value Added 
 
The similarity of production of the individual member states with the structure of the regional 
economic block is measured by the Bray-Curtis index. The index, which takes values 
between [0, 1], is a distance metric where lower values indicate a greater structural similarity 
of outputs between countries and regions. Denoting ijtx  to be the share of sector i in the total 
value added of country j in year t, itX to be the share of sector i  in the total value added of 
the regional bloc, and N as the total number of sector, the index is described as:16 
14 Only correlation between South Africa and the SACU are statistically significant, reflecting South Africa’s 
economic weight in the customs union. 
15 Understanding of the degree of shock synchronization with their RECs is important for the small REC 
members (e.g., all the SACU countries but South Africa and Burundi and Rwanda in the EAC). Where 
synchronization is weak, the countries can mitigate shocks via fiscal transfers or flexible labor markets. 
16 Alternatively, ijtx can be interpreted as the share of sector i  in the total value added of the regional bloc and 
itX as the share of sector i  in the total value added of the SSA or the group of advanced economies. For 
comparing the structural similarity of the EAC and SACU blocs with that of the advanced economies, ijtx can 
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According to this index the EAC countries have output structures closer to their bloc than the 
SACU countries, with South Africa accounting for most of the region while the other 
economies are less developed and have different structures. In both RECs, countries’ output 
structures have been converging to that of the group (Figure 3a). As the SACU, which 
consists of middle income countries and where South Africa prevails, is more developed than 
the EAC low income countries, its output structure is closer than the ECA’s to structure of 
the advanced economies (Figure 3b). The distance between the EAC’s output structure and 
that of the advanced economies has remained mostly unchanged over the past three decades.  
 
Figure 3. Bray-Curtis Structural Similarity Index for Output, 1980 - 2012 
 
3a. Individual Countries and RECs   3b. RECs and Advanced Economies  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN national accounts database.  
 
b. Structural Similarity Measured by Intra-Industry Trade 
 
Intra-industry trade flows are measured using Grubel-Lloyd index, which is derived in detail 
in Grubel and Lloyd (1971) and defined as follows:  
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where IIT represents the intra-industry index; ijktX  and ijktM represent, respectively, country 
j’s exports and imports of product class i to and from country k in year t. The ratio takes the 
minimum value of zero if there is no intra-industry trade and the maximum value of 100 if 
be interpreted as the share of sector i  in the total value added of the regional bloc and itX as the share of sector 
i  in the total value added of the group of advanced economies. 
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there is only intra-industry trade.17 The overall bilateral index of intra-industry trade between 
countries j and k is a weighted average of the indices for all product classes in which the 
shares of total trade of product i over total commodity trade is used as weights. 
 
The intra-industry trade has remained relatively low in both RECs until about mid-2000s, 
with the higher – and rising rapidly – intra-industry trade intensity in the EAC since then 
(Figure 4). Once again, these indices confirm greater structural similarity and hence 
likelihood of greater output shock synchronization among the EAC than the SACU members.  
 
Figure 4. Grubel-Lloyd Intra-Industry Trade Index, 1990 - 2012 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN Comtrade database.   
 
3.4 Intra-Regional Trade 
 
Due to numerous impediments, Africa’s regional trade is low compared to other world 
regions (Freemantle, 2013; Ancharaz et al. 2011; Longo and Sekkat, 2004). Specifically, the 
average share of intra-African exports in total exports during 2000 - 2012 was 11 percent, 
relative to 25 percent in Latin America and 51 percent in Asia. Again, differences exist 
among Africa’s sub-regions, with the intra-regional trade taking the largest – and increasing – 
share of total trade in the EAC. The trade integration in the SACU is low (Table 2). 
 
 Table 2. Shares of Intra-regional and Intra-African Trade (% of total exports) 
EAC 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2007 2008-2012 
EAC total exports (million US$) 1,951 2,827 5,225 10,022 
    Intra-EAC exports 10.3% 16.5% 19.6% 19.8% 
    Exports to rest of Africa 6.2% 7.8% 12.4% 14.0% 
    Total exports to Africa 16.5% 24.3% 32.0% 33.8% 
    Exports to advanced economies 68.0% 54.3% 41.5% 35.5% 
SACU 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2007 2008-2012 
SACU total exports (million US$) … … 48,196 85,435 
    Intra-SACU exports … … 3.2% 2.9% 
South Africa total exports (mln.  US$)  … … 58,617 78,916 
    Exports to Africa … … 13.9% 16.7% 
    Exports to advanced economies  … … 62.2% 54.4% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the trade data from the IMF DOTS database. 
17 We use the one-digit SITC (Revision 3) classification to compute the index for each product class. 
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Due to their deeper trade integration the total exports of the EAC countries fell less during the 
global crisis than in the SACU countries. Differently put, the EAC countries were shielded 
from a major drop in import demand in advanced economies that impacted the SACU 
countries. Another distinctive feature of the EAC members is their greater degree of trade 
diversification than in most of their peers in terms of export products. In Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, the top three products account for less than 40 percent of total exports, well below 
levels in the SACU. Necessities, especially food, accounted for most of the EAC’s exports 
(total and to the rest of Africa), making the EAC less vulnerable to global slump. Most of the 
manufacturing goods, for which the demand in advanced economies fell during the crisis, are 
exported to the East Africa, including through informal channels.18 
 
The SACU countries were less resilient to the global shock caused by the financial crisis, as 
they have close trade ties with South Africa, while having minimal trade ties with each other 
or the rest of Africa. The link with South Africa, which was heavily impacted through both 
financial and trade ties, made the small SACU countries vulnerable to the impact of the crisis. 
 
4. Empirical Investigation 
 
4.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
First, to confirm output comovements indicated by correlations in the previous Section, we 
determine output shock synchronization between the global economy and Africa’s RECs (and 
their members). We utilize SVAR model relying on output data only, as was done, for 
example, in Kim and Chow (2003) for shock synchronization among the traditional EU 
members and Brixiova et al. (2010) for synchronization between Estonia and the traditional 
EU countries. This particular SVAR implies that growth in a region and its member country 
can be driven by (i) common (global) shocks, that is shocks effecting many regions (countries) 
such as commodity price shocks or shocks transmitted into regions (countries) from other 
parts of the world via trade, financial flows and other links; or (ii) region-specific (country-
specific) shocks.19 Second, we examine the role of intra-regional – and intra-industry – trade 
in raising Africa’s resilience to global output shocks as in IMF (2013).  
 
4.2 Output Shock Synchronization 
 
Data  
 
Annual GDP data for the period 1980–2011 used in this section were obtained from the IMF 
WEO database. The data is collected at the country level at constant prices and converted to 
constant US$ dollars with fixed exchange rates. Global output is represented by a group of 34 
economies classified as “advanced”; SSA’s output is measured by GDP of all SSA countries 
with available data; and regional outputs of the EAC and the SACU are represented by the 
total GDP of their member countries; domestic output is captured by GDP of each country.20  
18 Uganda’s informal exports to its five neighbouring countries accounted for about half and one third of its total 
exports to these countries in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Main commodities traded through the informal trade 
in East Africa are food and manufacturing (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012; Lesser and Moisé-Leeman, 2009).    
19 Bayoumi and Vitek 82013) argue that global output shock spill-overs via finance are potential larger than via 
trade and less understood. Direct financial linkages are relatively less prominent in Africa.    
20 We calculate the first differences of the logarithm of the output variables. The results of the stationarity tests 
(ADF, KPSS) are reported in Table A1, Annex II. For robustness check, we carry out variance decompositions 
utilizing GDP in constant international dollars from the World Bank’s database (Annex III).  
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Structural VAR Approach21 
 
Using structural vector auto-regression (SVAR), this section evaluates to what extent growth 
in the members of two regional economic communities is impacted by global, regional and 
country-specific shocks.22 Our framework draws on three variables, namely, constant global, 
regional, and domestic outputs ( Gy , Ry  and Dy ) all expressed in logarithms. They are 
impacted by global, regional, and country-specific shocks ( Gε , Rε  and Dε ) according to:  
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where ∆  is the first difference operator and ( ) ppijijijijij LaLaLaaLA ++++= 2210   is a 
polynomial function of the lag operator, L. Structural shocks in the economy are classified 
into global, regional and country-specific as follows: 
 
i. Global (common) shocks affect real GDP growth in all countries, i.e. they are due to 
(i) global events, such as global financial crisis and ensuing financial uncertainty or 
(ii) shocks to advanced economies that were transmitted to most developing countries; 
ii. Regional shocks affect output growth in the regional economic communities (RECs). 
They reflect (i) common regional events, such as revival of the EAC, signing of EAP 
with the EU or (ii) shocks to some members of RECs transmitted to others; and 
iii. Country-specific output shocks affect individual countries. They are due to changes in 
macroeconomic policy, terms of trade shocks, productivity shocks, among others. 
 
We also test a SVAR system where Africa replaces global output. Specifically, in (3)  Dty  and 
D
tε  are replaced by 
C
ty  and 
C
tε  which denote the logarithm of continental output and the 
continental shock impacting output growth in African RECs and countries, respectively.  
 
Identification is obtained using Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered as above. 
We also impose long-run identifying restrictions on the impacts of shocks on the output 
growth where neither global nor regional growth rates are impacted by country-specific 
shocks in individual African countries. Further, global (continental) output growth is not 
affected by regional or country-specific shocks experienced in Africa. 23  The restrictions 
placed on (3) are thus ( ) ( ) ( ) 0231312 === LALALA . As standard in structural VAR analysis, 
we assume that the three types of shocks are not correlated and have unit variance, that is
It =)var(ε . For each country, we obtain variance decomposition and impulse response.
24  
 
 
21 As IMF (2007) underscores, any analysis at the global level faces trade-offs between the sophistication of the 
modeling framework— in this case, the economic interpretation of the shocks—and availability of data. The 
limited availability of data does not allow for carrying out GVAR analysis as in de Waal (2013).  
 
23 These assumptions are based on the small share of Africa in the global output.   
24 The lag structure – of order one – was determined using standard information criteria, including Akaike, 
Schwarz, Hannon-Quinn, etc. The results of the post-estimation Lagrange Multiplier tests show that residuals 
are not serially correlated; and the Jarque-Bera test results indicate that residuals are normally distributed. 
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Variance Decomposition 
 
We estimate the relative importance of the global, regional and domestic shocks in explaining 
the output growth changes in the selected African countries through structural variance 
decomposition. The reported results are those at the 10th year horizon, estimated from (3) 
both with the long-run restrictions (Table 3).25  
 
Several observations can be made from Table 3. First, in most countries studied, the domestic 
growth is impacted mainly by country-specific shocks. Hence in most African countries, 
idiosyncratic factors and country-specific conditions still drive growth. Second, regional 
shocks play a more significant role in the growth fluctuations of EAC countries, explaining 
on average one third of the forecast error variances. In contrast, regional shocks can only 
explain on average only less than one fifth of the output growth fluctuations of the small 
SACU members.26 The results confirm that output shocks were more synchronized within the 
EAC than the SACU regions. Third, compared with the EAC, growth rates of the small 
SACU members are more likely to be influenced by the global economy (they explain about 
25 percent of the output variance). The SACU countries were more affected by the crisis due 
to, among other factors, South Africa’s deeper integration into the global financial system.  
 
Table 3. Variance Decomposition: Global, Regional and Domestic Shocks 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for EAC member states   
Output Growth Standard Error Global Shock EAC Shock Domestic Shock 
Burundi 0.04 3.37  21.08  75.55  
Kenya 0.02 0.29  79.21  20.50  
Rwanda 0.13 0.43  10.54  89.03  
Tanzania 0.02 21.32  71.56  7.12  
Uganda 0.03 9.16  1.20  89.65  
Panel B. Variance decompositions for SACU member states   
Output Growth Standard Error Global Shock SACU Shock Domestic Shock 
Botswana 0.05  45.44  1.60  52.95  
Lesotho 0.02  0.02  21.44  78.54  
Namibia 0.03  12.39  34.19  53.43  
S. Africa 0.02  2.47  97.03  0.50  
Swaziland 0.04  41.69  8.98  49.33  
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of growth variation due to shocks in the 
global economy, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as in (3). 
 
On balance, variance decomposition based on our SVAR model of global, regional and 
country-specific growths gives empirical evidence that the EAC members are experiencing 
greater co-movements in output than countries in the SACU. In contrast, the SACU countries 
are more exposed to the global shocks, transmitted to them directly and via South Africa.27  
 
25  Cholesky decomposition obtained by estimating (3) without imposing the long-run restrictions but by 
providing structure through ordering is in Annex III. Results of variance decompositions for global and regional 
growth at various horizons and domestic growth from one-year to nine-year horizons are available upon request.  
26 Being a large economy within SACU, South Africa is heavily affected by regional shocks, by design.  
27 The relative importance of global (continental), regional and domestic shocks observed in Cholesky 
decompositions are mostly consistent with those in structural decomposition (Annex III). 
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When Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth replaces global growth in our model, country-specific 
shocks remain the main factor behind growth fluctuations in most countries. Continental and 
regional shocks are notably more important in the EAC than in the SACU’s (small states) 
output fluctuations, consistently with the EAC countries having closer trade ties with each 
other and the rest of Africa. For the EAC, continental and regional shocks explain on average 
about one third and one fourth of the variance of domestic growth, respectively (Table 4). 
 
Impulse Responses 
 
Impulse response functions give additional insights into output co-movements by tracing the 
effects of shocks over time. Figure A1, Annex IV shows responses of domestic growth to one 
standard deviation in global, regional and country-specific shocks, based on the estimates of 
(3). In the EAC countries, regional shocks have more profound effects on growth than 
country specific shocks, especially in the longer run. Consistently with findings from the 
variance decompositions, the EAC members do not respond significantly to global shocks, 
suggesting that the EAC countries are more resilient to global shocks than the SACU region.  
 
Table 4. Variance Decomposition: Continental, Regional and Domestic Shocks 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for EAC member states   
Output Growth Standard Error SSA Shock EAC Shock Domestic Shock 
Burundi 0.04  18.16  36.31  45.53  
Kenya 0.02  26.54  59.10  14.35  
Rwanda 0.13  10.02  1.62  88.36  
Tanzania 0.03  88.01  6.56  5.43  
Uganda 0.03  18.89  34.41  46.69  
Panel B. Variance decompositions for SACU member states   
Output Growth Standard Error SSA Shock SACU Shock Domestic Shock 
Botswana 0.05  9.99  35.90  54.10  
Lesotho 0.02  7.42  19.94  72.64  
Namibia 0.03  29.53  10.10  60.36  
S. Africa 0.02  83.48  15.79  0.73  
Swaziland 0.04  29.53  9.69  60.78  
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of growth variation due to shocks in 
Africa, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as specified in (3). 
 
Regarding impulse responses of the SACU countries, with the exception of Botswana, growth 
rates respond most significantly to country specific shocks. Except for South Africa, growth 
of individual countries tends to be independent of the regional shocks. Overall, responses of 
the SACU countries to regional shocks are even less noticeable than those to global shocks, 
indicating that the region is less integrated than the EAC and more exposed to global shocks. 
  
Figure A2, Annex II shows the responses of the domestic growth to positive one standard 
deviation in continental, regional, and country-specific shocks in the EAC and the SACU.28 
While the effects of continental shocks on growth of the EAC countries are relatively 
substantial and persistent, particularly in the longer run, they play a minor role in the case of 
the SACU members. However, the responses of EAC member states’ output growth rates to 
regional shocks are now low, suggesting that economic development of the EAC is closely 
linked to that of Africa, as also indicated by structural similarity index and output co-
28 The impulse responses are obtained from the VAR model as specified in (3) for each of the sample countries.   
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movements (Figure 2). In contrast to the EAC, the small SACU members respond mostly to 
country-specific shocks and are also more likely to be influenced by the global shocks. 
 
Figure 5. Growth in selected countries and weighted growth of their key trading partners (%) 
 
5a. Botswana and trading partners (%)    5b. Burundi and trading partners (%) 
  
 
5c. Kenya and trading partners (%)     5d. Namibia and trading partners (%) 
   
5e. Rwanda and trading partners (%)  5f. South Africa and trading partners (%) 
  
5g. Tanzania and trading partners (%) 5h. Uganda and trading partners (%) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF and WTO databases. 
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4.3 The Role of Trade Linkages29 
 
What is the role of trade linkages in transmitting shocks from (i) the advanced economies or 
Africa into regional communities or (ii) from the advanced economies, Africa, and the 
regional communities into REC’s members? Figure 5 illustrates that ‘where you export 
matters’, that is that the trade linkages seem positively associated with output co-
movements.30 African exports are vulnerable to banking crises in the countries they export to 
(Berman and Martin, 2012). Greater diversification across trading partners helps reduce 
vulnerability to slowdown in individual trading partners (Figure 5 and Abiad et al., 2012).31  
 
As shown by Krugman (1991), Frankel and Rose (1997) and Fidrmuc (2004) for developed 
countries and Calderon (2007) for developing countries, the response of output co-
movements to trade depends on the structure of production among country-pairs and intra-
industry trade.  To assess the role of intra-regional trade as a buffer against output shocks 
from advanced economies, we regress growth correlations between country pairs on trade 
linkages between them for both RECs.  
 
When growth rates are more correlated due to deeper intra-regional trade linkages, intra-
regional trade should help absorb global shocks. Table 5 shows results of pooled OLS and 
(country-pair) fixed-effect regressions, using data during 1981–2011. The dependent variable 
is output synchronization (Syncjkt) measured by the pair-wise correlations of real annual GDP 
growth between countries j and k in each REC and period. Intra-industry trade (iitjkt) is 
measured by the pair-wise Grubel-Lloyd index. Bilateral trade linkage (btjkt) is measured by 
the exports between countries j and k as percent of their total exports. Structural similarity 
(djkt) is measured by the pair-wise Bray-Curtis index. 
 
Table 5. Trade Linkages and Output Co-movements – Regression Results 
 Pooled OLS regressions  Fixed-effect regressions 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
djkt 
–0.14 
  (–1.63)   
–0.27 
  (–1.30)  
–0.07 
  (–0.43)   
–0.43 
  (–1.16) 
iitjkt  
  0.15** 
  (2.28)  
  0.02 
  (0.15)   
–0.16 
  (–0.50)  
–0.15 
  (–0.43) 
btjkt   
  0.13** 
  (2.11) 
  0.08 
  (1.03)    
  0.09 
  (0.98) 
  0.04 
  (0.31) 
constant –0.08   (–0.56) 
  0.52*** 
  (3.82) 
  0.76** 
  (2.67) 
  0.07 
  (0.11)  
  0.02 
  (0.07) 
–0.12 
  (–0.19) 
  0.58 
  (1.28) 
–0.75 
  (1.20) 
          
Obs.   56   30   26   20    56   30   26   20 
Pairs   20   20   10   10    20   20   10   10 
R2   0.04   0.11   0.20   0.22    0.04   0.11   0.20   0.15 
Note: The t-statistics for robust errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All indices are in logs. 
 
The results of pooled OLS regression – with positive and statistically significant coefficients 
on intra-industry trade and bilateral trade ties within the two RECs – suggest that an increase 
29 In Africa, the impact of financial linkages would be lower due to its limited financial integration.  
30 As IMF (2013) point out, the impact of trade is difficult to separate from effects of common border and 
language, currency and cultural similarity, which all facilitate trade.  
31 Abiad et al. (2012) also suggest that increased financial openness, changes in the composition in the capital 
flows, and income equality raise resilience to shocks.  
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in intra-regional trade tends to raise output co-movements between the REC members.32 The 
result is consistent with the observation that the EAC countries trade more with each other 
and on average record higher growth rates than the SACU members.  
 
The EAC’s deeper intra-regional trade and its fewer trade ties with advanced economies have 
strengthened capacity of this REC to reduce exports volatility and mitigate global output 
shocks. Further, unlike the case of the SACU where the small countries export mostly to 
South Africa, the EAC’s regional trade is better diversified among various members and 
other countries in the region (Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo). This underscores the 
importance of export diversification and trading with fast growing economies.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have sought answers to the following questions: Can intra-regional trade 
help explain the differences in output co-movements between the advanced economies and 
the EAC and the SACU regions? What can other African countries and regions learn from the 
EAC about mitigating the impact of global output shocks on their economies? We have 
studied the EAC and the SACU regions because of the markedly different growth outcomes 
and the intensity of the intra-regional and intra-Africa trade that they exhibited.   
 
Several empirical methods, including structural VAR and fixed-effect regressions, were 
utilized to answer the above questions. We found that in part due to its deeper intra-regional 
trade ties – both within the REC and with Africa – the EAC has exhibited greater resilience to 
output shocks stemming from the global financial crisis than the SACU region. The example 
of small SACU countries shows once again that excessive trade concentration on one or two 
trading partners exposed to substantial exogenous shocks creates a major vulnerability.  
 
The policy implications from our analysis go beyond a simple suggestion to promote regional 
integration to build resilience. The example of the small SACU members, which trade 
heavily with South Africa (and the EU) but relatively little with other emerging markets, 
shows that countries would benefit from export diversification into fast growing countries 
economies e to reduce their exposure to the global output shocks. 
 
The global financial crisis and the increased frequency of aggregate shocks have raised 
interest of African policy-makers and the public in building resilience of their economies. In 
this paper we show that regional integration, in particular intra-regional and intra-Africa trade 
with fast-growing economies, together with geographically diversified trade links, can 
strengthen the capacity of countries to absorb global output shocks.   
 
This paper has raised several important issues for future research. First is the relation between 
regional integration and intra-regional trade on the one hand and strengthening multilateral 
trade ties on the other. It needs to be underscored that our results should not be interpreted as 
support to regional integration via preferential regional trade agreements at the expense of 
multilateral trade. Intra-regional trade in Africa would benefit from improved regional 
infrastructure, reducing red tape at the border, improving business environment, and 
facilitating labor mobility, which are all factors that would facilitate trade in general. The 
specific barriers to regional trade vary across Africa’s regions and are left to further research. 
Second, we have focused on the transmission of shocks from the advanced economies to 
32 While the results of the fixed effect regression are not significant, the coefficients have the same sign.  
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Africa, leaving the impact of shocks in emerging markets on Africa to further investigation.33 
Third, future research could examine if and how the intra-regional trade in Africa facilitates 
regional value chains and integration of African countries into the global value chains.34  
  
33 Drummond and Liu (2013) studied spill-overs from changes in China’s investment to Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
export. They found that one percentage increase (decline) in China’s domestic investment growth is associated 
with an average 0.6 percentage increase (decline) in Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports.  
34 Bems at el. (2010) examine the implications of trade in intermediate goods for transmission of shocks across 
border and the empirical relationship between demand, trade and production.   
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Annex I.  Output Co-movements 1980 – 2012 
 
Table A1. Correlation Coefficients for the GDP Growth Variables  
Panel A. Correlation coefficients for the variables used in the EAC analyses 
Output Growth Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda EAC SSA 
Kenya   0.29 
  (0.10) 
  1 
 
     Rwanda   0.13 
  (0.47) 
  0.07 
  (0.70) 
 1 
 
    Tanzania   0.26 
  (0.15) 
  0.49*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.30* 
  (0.10) 
 1 
 
   Uganda –0.41** 
  (0.02) 
  0.15 
  (0.43) 
  0.02 
  (0.92) 
  0.28 
  (0.12) 
 1 
 
  EAC   0.28 
  (0.12) 
  0.76*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.48*** 
  (0.01) 
  0.84*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.41** 
  (0.02) 
 1 
 
 SSA   0.18 
  (0.32) 
  0.38** 
  (0.03) 
  0.31* 
  (0.09) 
  0.68*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.41** 
  (0.02) 
  0.70*** 
  (0.00) 
 1 
 
Advanced Global –0.05 
  (0.79) 
  0.15 
  (0.42) 
–0.06 
  (0.76) 
–0.10 
  (0.60) 
–0.19 
  (0.31) 
–0.05 
  (0.78) 
  0.00 
  (0.99) 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients for the variables used in the SACU analyses 
Output Growth  Botswana  Lesotho  Namibia  S. Africa  Swaziland  SACU  SSA 
Lesotho –0.01 
  (0.94) 
  1 
 
     Namibia –0.05 
  (0.77) 
–0.11 
  (0.54) 
 1 
 
    South Africa   0.11 
  (0.55) 
  0.00 
  (1.00) 
  0.16 
  (0.39) 
 1 
 
   Swaziland   0.31* 
  (0.08) 
  0.02 
  (0.91) 
–0.30* 
  (0.09) 
  0.06 
  (0.73) 
 1 
 
  SACU   0.16 
  (0.38) 
  0.00 
  (0.99) 
  0.19 
  (0.30) 
  1.00*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.08 
  (0.68) 
 1 
 
 SSA –0.05 
  (0.78) 
  0.05 
  (0.80) 
  0.17 
  (0.34) 
  0.82*** 
  (0.00) 
–0.10 
  (0.59) 
  0.81*** 
  (0.00) 
 1 
 
Advanced Global   0.53*** 
  (0.00) 
  0.04 
  (0.83) 
  0.19 
  (0.29) 
  0.32* 
  (0.07) 
  0.36** 
  (0.04) 
  0.36** 
  (0.04) 
  0.00 
  (0.99) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF WEO database.  
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Annex II. Stationarity Tests 
 
Table A1. Test for Stationarity of the Real GDP Growth Rate 
Panel A. Tests for stationarity for the variables used in the EAC analyses 
GDP Obs. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test  KPSS Test 
(Log difference)  t-statistic p-value  LM-statistic 10% level 
Burundi 31 –3.82*** 0.01  0.16 0.35 
Kenya 31 –3.42** 0.02  0.13 0.35 
Rwanda 31 –5.06*** 0.00  0.27 0.35 
Tanzania 31 –1.90 0.33  0.52** 0.35 
Uganda 31 –3.10** 0.04  0.34 0.35 
EAC 31 –2.55 0.12  0.40* 0.35 
SSA 31 –2.89* 0.06  0.51** 0.35 
Advanced Global 31 –3.74*** 0.01  0.39* 0.35 
Panel B. Tests for stationarity for the variables used in the SACU analyses 
GDP Obs. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test  KPSS Test 
(Log difference)  t-statistic p-value  LM-statistic 10% level 
Botswana 31 –4.13*** 0.00  0.46* 0.35 
Lesotho 31 –7.25*** 0.00  0.11 0.35 
Namibia 31 –5.58*** 0.00  0.62** 0.35 
South Africa 31 –4.17*** 0.00  0.40* 0.35 
Swaziland 31 –1.12 0.69  0.54** 0.35 
SACU 31 –4.22*** 0.00  0.39* 0.35 
SSA 31 –2.89* 0.06  0.51** 0.35 
Advanced Global 31 –3.74*** 0.01  0.39* 0.35 
Notes: The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test 
for stationarity are applied to the constant GDP series in the log difference form. For most of the time series, at 
least one of the two tests confirms the stationarity at the 10% significance level. . 
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Annex III—Variance Decomposition with GDP 
  
Table A1. Cholesky Variance Decomposition: Global, Regional and Domestic Shocks (GDP 
in constant 2005 prices and exchange rates) 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for EAC member states   
Output Growth Standard Error Global Shock EAC Shock Domestic Shock 
Burundi 0.04 5.86 16.97 77.17 
Kenya 0.02 3.40 56.94 39.66 
Rwanda 0.13 1.28 20.21 78.51 
Tanzania 0.02 10.74 35.53 53.73 
Uganda 0.03 0.29 31.08 68.63 
Panel B. Variance decompositions for SACU member states   
Output Growth Standard Error Global Shock SACU Shock Domestic Shock 
Botswana 0.05  24.75  3.52  71.72  
Lesotho 0.02  0.75  2.92  96.33  
Namibia 0.03  18.99  2.29  78.72  
S. Africa 0.02  27.40  72.29  0.31  
Swaziland 0.04  10.44  29.15  60.41  
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of growth variation due to shocks in the 
global economy, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as in (3). 
 
Table A2. Cholesky Variance Decomposition: SSA, Regional and Domestic Shocks (GDP in 
constant 2005 prices and exchange rates) 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for EAC member states   
Output Growth Standard Error SSA Shock EAC Shock Domestic Shock 
Burundi 0.04  11.40  10.83  77.77  
Kenya 0.02  16.33  43.62  40.05  
Rwanda 0.13  8.58  13.28  78.13  
Tanzania 0.03  45.61  11.86  42.54  
Uganda 0.03  13.28  18.41  68.31  
Panel B. Variance decompositions for SACU member states   
Output Growth Standard Error SSA Shock SACU Shock Domestic Shock 
Botswana 0.05  2.37  7.82  89.82  
Lesotho 0.02  0.58  5.41  94.01  
Namibia 0.03  9.14  5.78  85.08  
S. Africa 0.02  73.75  25.75  0.50  
Swaziland 0.04  8.57  3.43  88.00  
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of growth variation due to shocks in 
Africa, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as specified in (3). 
  
19 
 
Table A3. Variance Decomposition: Global, Regional and Domestic Shocks (in constant 
international $) 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for the EAC member states   
Output 
Growth 
Standard 
Error 
Cholesky Decomposition  Structural Decomposition 
Global EAC Domestic  Global EAC Domestic 
Burundi 0.05 0.59 37.94 61.46  30.79 24.75 44.46 
Kenya 0.02 3.86 55.47 40.67  2.69 83.95 13.36 
Rwanda 0.19 3.81 29.08 67.11  1.51 16.20 82.29 
Tanzania 0.02 5.07 60.08 34.85  28.01 66.85 5.14 
Uganda 0.02 1.66 34.63 63.71  3.14 12.51 84.34 
Panel B. Variance decompositions for the SACU member states   
Output 
Growth 
Standard 
Error 
Cholesky Decomposition  Structural Decomposition 
Global SACU Domestic  Global SACU Domestic 
Botswana 0.04 26.53 1.99 71.48  68.39 4.52 27.09 
Lesotho 0.02 0.67 0.71 98.62  3.09 2.03 94.89 
Namibia 0.03 10.28 3.98 85.74  10.06 17.19 72.76 
S. Africa 0.02 20.95 70.32 8.73  1.20 88.21 10.59 
Swaziland 0.05 11.95 19.03 69.02  30.37 10.42 59.21 
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of growth variation due to shocks in the 
global economy, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as in (3). 
 
Table A4. Variance Decomposition: Continental, Regional and Domestic Shocks (in constant 
international $) 
Panel A. Variance decompositions for EAC member states   
Output 
Growth 
Standard 
Error 
Cholesky Decomposition  Structural Decomposition 
Africa EAC Domestic  Africa EAC Domestic 
Burundi 0.05 40.80 1.14 58.06  47.23 23.34 29.43 
Kenya 0.02 52.78 12.61 34.61  53.00 21.26 25.74 
Rwanda 0.19 22.13 25.59 52.28  23.63 3.10 73.26 
Tanzania 0.02 72.59 5.83 21.58  75.31 11.82 12.87 
Uganda 0.02 12.73 20.42 66.85  40.36 2.01 57.63 
Panel B. Variance decompositions for SACU member states   
Output 
Growth 
Standard 
Error 
Cholesky Decomposition  Structural Decomposition 
Africa SACU Domestic  Africa SACU Domestic 
Botswana 0.04 9.83 2.19 87.98  17.43 2.60 79.97 
Lesotho 0.02 7.27 1.87 90.86  4.02 0.22 95.75 
Namibia 0.03 11.04 3.98 84.98  11.56 10.32 78.12 
S. Africa 0.02 52.30 41.71 5.99  77.23 18.64 4.13 
Swaziland 0.05 1.11 4.24 94.65  19.71 4.47 75.82 
Notes: Variance decomposition of forecast errors explains percentage of output growth variation due to shocks 
in Africa, regions and individual countries. Results are obtained by estimating the VAR model as in (3). 
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Annex IV.  Impulse Response Functions 
 
Figure A1. Responses of Countries’ Growth to Global, Regional and Domestic Shocks 
Panel A. Impulse responses for the EAC member states   
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 Panel B. Impulse responses for the SACU member states   
  
  
 
 
Notes: Impulse responses trace the effects of one standard deviation global, regional and domestic shocks on 
countries’ output growth over time. Results from Cholesky specification are similar to those above. 
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Figure A3. Responses of Countries’ Growth to SSA, Regional and Domestic Shocks 
Panel A. Impulse responses for the EAC member states   
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 Panel B. Impulse responses for the SACU member states   
  
  
 
 
Notes: Impulse responses trace the effects of one standard deviation SSA, regional and domestic shocks on 
countries’ output growth over time. Results from Cholesky specification are similar to those above. Impulse 
responses with confidence intervals are available upon request. 
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